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THE ICEBERG EMERGED: WISCONSIN'S
EXTENSION OF RISK CONTRIBUTION THEORY
BEYOND DES
I. INTRODUCTION
Noted twentieth century torts scholar Leon Green' once stated:
"The beginning point of all tort liability is affirmative conduct, and the
first step in establishing a defendant's liability is to identify him and
connect his conduct with the victim's injury."2  But what happens in
cases where that first step cannot be realized because the tortfeasor is
unknown? This was the case with a young Milwaukee boy named
Steven Thomas who, when only fourteen months old, began exhibiting
symptoms of lead poisoning.' Steven's doctor found that the cognitive
defects Steven suffered from were common of children poisoned by
lead.4 In Steven's case, the damage was permanent.' He will require
lifelong care and now faces greater risks of developing complications in
the future, including such problems as kidney disease.6 Steven's doctor
concluded that the high levels of lead in Steven's blood stemmed
exclusively from ingesting the lead-based pigment found in paint] The
City of Milwaukee Health Department documented lead violations at
the home where Steven and his family lived when he first began
exhibiting symptoms of lead poisoning.' The Thomas family lived at
two different residences in Milwaukee, each residence being over one
1. Leon Green (1888-1979), former Dean of Northwestern University School of Law,
exemplified the Realist movement in legal scholarship in the early to mid-twentieth century.
He believed legal theories should be practical and workable rather than abstract and
metaphysical. Green's propositions for revisions in theories of causation and duty in
negligence law were some of the most original and influential of this era. G. EDWARD
WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 75-78 (2003); see Leon
Green Papers, 1929-1947, Northwestern University School of Law, http://www.library
.Northwestern.edu/archives/findingaids/greenjleon.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
2. Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 546
(1962).
3. Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 1 6, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 6, 701 N.W.2d 523, 6.
4. Id. 1 11,285 Wis. 2d 236, 11,701 N.W.2d 523, 11.
5. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, $ 11, 701 N.W.2d 523, 11.
6. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 11, 701 N.W.2d 523, 11.
7. id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 11, 701 N.W.2d 523, 1 11(emphasis added).
8. Id. T$ 7-8, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 11 7-8, 701 N.W.2d 523, 11 7-8.
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hundred years old. 9 In each residence, there were several layers of lead
paint that had been applied over the years." The Thomas family was
unable to identify the precise producer of the white lead carbonate
pigment Steven ingested; therefore, Steven could not meet the first
crucial step in establishing liability."
The problem of lead poisoning remains a great and dangerous
concern. Around 38 million homes in the United States still contain
some lead paint, 2 and in 2004, about 3,300 children under the age of six
suffered lead poisoning in Wisconsin." In young children, lead
poisoning can result in reduced intelligence quotient ("IQ"), learning
disabilities, attention deficit disorders, stunted growth, and kidney
damage. 4 With the potential for such severe damage, it is imperative
that the courts fashion relief for plaintiffs who are injured by the actions
of the tortfeasor, even if the tortfeasor is unknown.
In the 1970s, a rash of lawsuits against manufacturers of the drug
Diethylstilbestrol ("DES"), which was given to women as a miscarriage
preventative, forced the issue of how to deal with the missing tortfeasor
to the legal forefront."' The Wisconsin Supreme Court also faced this
issue with DES in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.'6 and drafted a solution: a risk
contribution theory that utilized the state statute for comparative
negligence and apportioned liability based on the proportion of the
market a manufacturer held when the plaintiff was injured.17 Scholars
viewed these theories of liability based on market share' 8 with great
potential, surmising the DES cases would be the "tip of an iceberg."'1 9
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that risk contribution
9. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 7-8, 701 N.W.2d 523, 1% 7-8.
10. Id. % 12, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 12, 701 N.W.2d 523, 12.
11. Id. 27,285 Wis. 2d 236, 27, 701 N.W.2d 523, 27; see Green, supra note 2, at 546.
12. National Safety Council - Lead Poisoning, http://www.nsc.orglibrary/factslead.htm
(last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
13. Jamaal Abdul-Alim, One Lead-Paint Defendant Settles, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Oct. 27, 2005, at lB.
14. National Safety Council - Lead Poisoning, supra note 12.
15. Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share
Liability for Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151, 159 (2004).
16. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
17. Id. at 197-99, 342 N.W.2d at 52-53.
18. Please note for the purposes of this Comment there is no material difference
between the theory of "market share liability" and "risk contribution theory." Risk
contribution theory is simply the terminology used by the Wisconsin courts.
19. Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 1007 (1978).
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theory could be used for other goods "factually similar" to DES,2 ° yet
failed to define what "factually similar" meant. 2 Despite high hopes for
using this theory, for many jurisdictions over twenty-one years after
Collins, "the iceberg remains almost completely submerged., 22 While
many jurisdictions outside of Wisconsin have had the opportunity to
adopt some form of market share liability, only a minority of
jurisdictions chose to adopt it, and those who have adopted it usually
only entertained the theory for DES cases. 3 In the twenty-one years
after the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided Collins, Wisconsin courts
faced only two cases where risk contribution theory was argued for a
product other than DES, and both of these cases terminated with the
court of appeals failing to extend risk contribution theory.
It was not until 2005 that the Wisconsin Supreme Court once again
faced the opportunity to extend risk contribution theory for a product
beyond DES. The case of the young Milwaukee boy, Steven Thomas,
provided the ideal situation for the Wisconsin Supreme Court to revisit
the issue of risk contribution theory for a product beyond DES: lead
carbonate. In Thomas v. Mallet,25 the Wisconsin Supreme Court boldly
extended this useful theory beyond the scope of DES in a way that most
jurisdictions refused to do for fear of disrupting the traditional theory of
fungibility.26 Rather than arguing fungibility was unnecessary27 or
completely abolishing the need for fungibility, the court restated and
refined the meaning of fungibility, creating a usable test for risk
contribution theory. 28 The court needed a situation "factually similar"
to Collins to extend the theory;29 yet, the court failed to truly define
20. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 191,342 N.W.2d at 49.
21. See Rostron, supra note 15, at 170 (stating that the court examined the possibility of
applying risk contribution theory to products other than DES, but it failed to explain what
exactly that meant).
22. Id. at 215.
23. LAWRENCE G. CETRULO, 1 Toxic TORTS LITIGATION GUIDE § 3:11 (2005)
("Variations of the market share theory have been adopted in a minority of jurisdictions. The
theory has found little acceptance, however, outside of the unique fact situation presented by
the marketing of DES.").
24. See Rogers v. AAA Wire Prods., Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 263, 513 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App.
1994); Drezdzon v. AAA Ins. Co., No. 84-273, 1984 WL 180237 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1984).
Neither of these cases were appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
25. 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.
26. See generally Rostron, supra note 15.
27. Id.
28. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 9 142-44, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 11 142-44, 701 N.W.2d 523,
142-44.
29. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 191,342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (1984).
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"factually similar" until Thomas. With Thomas, the court found that to
be factually similar, one must show, among the other requirements for a
prima facie case, that a product is fungible.3" To be fungible, the
product must be functionally interchangeable and physically
indistinguishable, and there must be a uniformity of risk.3' These
elements will be considered based on the plaintiff's specific fact
situation.32 This theory expanded the definition of fungible enough to
allow the theory to apply to goods beyond DES, specifically because of
the broad way in which the court defined uniformity of risk. The
uniformity of risk is based on the risk of the underlying defective
component of the product, taking into consideration the specific
situation.
As a result, risk contribution theory has an application beyond the
DES cases to other products such as asbestos33 and vaccines' that does
not bend the definition of fungible beyond all possible recognition. The
Thomas court made a sound extension of the Collins decision, and this
extension will be a strong theory that will allow injured plaintiffs a new
avenue to litigate cases they might not otherwise be able to litigate.
Also, by articulating a precise definition of fungibility, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has ensured that the "floodgates" of litigation will not
be opened to any and all plaintiffs injured by any and all products in
which the plaintiffs cannot identify the manufacturer.35 In Collins, the
court specifically looked at fungibility as "chemical identity," 6 though
30. See Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 131,137,285 Wis. 2d 236, $ 131,137, 701 N.W.2d 523,
[ 131,137.
31. Id. 1 142-44, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 142-44, 701 N.W.2d 523, $ 142-44.
32. See id. $ 145, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 145, 701 N.W.2d 523, 145.
33. Shirley H. Fang, Comment, Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.: Rejection of Market
Share Liability in Lead-Based Paint Litigation, 43 BuFF. L. REV. 725, 739-40 (1995).
34. Rostron, supra note 15, at 174-80.
35. A common criticism of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in Thomas is that it
will open the floodgate for plaintiffs to sue based on market share for any product in which
the plaintiff cannot identify the manufacturer of the product. See Memorandum from Wis.
Mfrs. & Commerce to Members of the Wis. Senate, Support S.B. 402-The Wisconsin Jobs
Preservation Act (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://www.wmc.org /printdisplay.cfm?ID=1155
[hereinafter Memorandum from Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce]. The Wisconsin Manufacturers &
Commerce is the state's largest business organization. Mark Johnson, Doyle Wields Veto on
Lead Paint Bill, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2006, at lB.
36. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 180, 342 N.W.2d 37, 44 (1984). Chemical
identity is a tricky subject. For the Collins court, it was swayed by the fact DES is generally
made by the same chemical formula and with this same chemical formula, DES created the
same risk. See id. In contrast, white lead carbonate was comprised of three potential
formulas, 4PbCO32Pb(OH)2PbO, 2PbCO3Pb(OH), and PbCO3. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 137
n.45, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 137 n.45, 701 N.W.2d 523, 137 n.45. Yet, the court considers the
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what it acknowledged by the term "chemical identity" was the "generic"
nature of DES, which made it interchangeable and indistinguishable as
well as uniform in risk.37 In the two cases that arose after Collins, the
court of appeals utilized the Collins precedent, and in both cases, it
refused to extend the theory of risk contribution because the products
were not "factually similar" to DES; they failed to meet the definition of
fungibility.38 Because the court will not impose risk contribution theory
on a product that cannot meet the standard of fungibility, it is unlikely
the "floodgates" will open up to lawsuits on any and all products.
Yet, in the wake of Thomas, the Wisconsin legislature, feeling
uncomfortable with the lengths to which the Wisconsin Supreme Court
extended risk contribution theory, proposed a statute to severely limit
the use of risk contribution theory.39  However, with Wisconsin
Governor Jim Doyle's veto and the legislature's inaction since the
veto, 4° risk contribution theory still exists in full force to be used for the
benefit of other plaintiffs and other products.
In the shadow of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's groundbreaking
decision, Part II of this Comment will look at the path that led the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to Thomas by exploring how the definition of
fungibility evolved in Wisconsin law. Part III will describe the context
of risk contribution theory in Wisconsin through a study of how the
theory was applied in other jurisdictions and will then explore the
genesis of the risk contribution theory in Wisconsin. Part IV will show
how the Wisconsin Supreme Court found a "factually similar" situation
to Collins and defined it as one where the product in question meets a
three-prong test of fungibility, including the elements of functional
uniformity of risk, being the lead, to be the same for each potential formula. Id. 140, 285
Wis. 2d 236, $ 140, 701 N.W.2d 523, 140. In this way, exact chemical identity is not
necessary; however, depending on the product, it may or may not occur. Chemical identity is
not dispositive of a fungible product, but factors into the element of uniformity of risk. The
Thomas court expands this idea from Collins, in which the court just happened to be dealing
with a chemically identical product at the time. The real issue is the risk created by the
product. See id. 139, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 139, 701 N.W.2d 523, 139.
37. See Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 180, 342 N.W.2d at 44. The court acknowledged DES
prescriptions could be filled with DES from any manufacturer. Id. The court also
acknowledged DES created a uniformity of risk. Id. at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
38. See Rogers v. AAA Wire Prods., Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 263, 513 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App.
1994); Drezdzon v. AAA Ins. Co., No. 84-273, 1984 WL 180237 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1984).
39. Wisconsin Jobs Preservation Act, S.B. 402, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
40. See Johnson, supra note 35. Governor Doyle vetoed the bill on Friday, January 6,




interchangeability, physical indistinguishability, and uniformity of risk.41
Part V will address the effect of the statute proposed in response to
Thomas on risk contribution theory in Wisconsin and will offer some
remarks on the future of risk contribution in Wisconsin tort law.
II. EVOLVING DEFINITIONS OF FUNGIBILITY
A. Fungibility in Goods: The Uniform Commercial Code
Commercial law reflects a more traditional view of fungibility that
considered the likeness of goods based on their nature and usage. The
fungibility of certain goods is important not only in deciding tort cases
under risk contribution theory, but appears in cases involving sales
disputes under Wisconsin's version of the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC").42 Wisconsin's UCC defines fungible goods as those goods
equivalent to another like unit based on the goods' nature or usage or, if
by agreement, certain goods that are treated as equivalents.43 Though
fungibility under the Wisconsin UCC is not necessarily indicative of how
the term will be used in cases of products liability, it illuminates how the
legislature considered the definition of fungibility for goods.
B. Fungibility in Products: An Expanding Definition for Torts
Traditionally, fungibility in commercial law considered the
equivalence of goods based on their nature and usage. ' When applying
fungibility in torts, the courts break down fungibility into three
definitions, each used in different forms by different courts; this process
began in the DES cases." The definitions include (1) functional
interchangeability, (2) physical indistinguishability, and (3) uniformity
of risk.'  The first two definitions reflect the definition of fungibility
encapsulated in the UCC-a likeness of goods based on nature and
usage.47 It is the addition of the third idea, uniformity of risk, which is
the key to fungibility in torts.48
41. See Rostron, supra note 15, at 163-67.
42. See, e.g., Badger Produce Co. v. Prelude Foods Int'l, Inc., 130 Wis. 2d 230, 240, 387
N.W.2d 98, 103 (Ct. App. 1986) (considering the fungibility of boxes under Wisconsin's
Uniform Commercial Code).
43. WIS. STAT. § 401.201(17) (2003-2004).
44. See id.
45. See Rostron, supra note 15, at 163-67.
46. See id.
47. See § 401.201(17).
48. See Rostron, supra note 15, at 166.
[90:383
EXTENSION OF RISK CONTRIBUTION THEORY
The Wisconsin Supreme Court introduced the idea of fungibility in
the context of DES in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.' 9 The court described
DES as fungible, in a "'generic' form, which did not contain any clearly
identifiable shape, color, or markings. DES was a fungible drug
produced with a chemically identical formula, and often pharmacists
would fill DES prescriptions from whatever stock they had on hand,
whether or not a particular brand was specified in the prescription. '
This court recognized that DES was both functionally interchangeable
and physically indistinguishable; yet, unlike other goods considered
under the UCC definition of fungible, DES also created a uniformity of
risk, with each manufacturer contributing to the risk of injury to the
public.'
C. Fungibility in Products beyond DES: Exploring Definitions in
Thomas v. Mallett
In Thomas, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explored definitions of
fungibility.52  The court defined "functionally interchangeable" as
dependent on the function at issue and stated that "functionally
interchangeable" is significant because it may be the very reason why a
product is difficult to identify.53 Like "functional interchangeability,"
the court identified "physically indistinguishable" as highly contextual
and dependent on the degree of physical similarity of the products.
5 4
This meaning of fungible is also important because it causes the initial
problem of product identification, giving rise to the application of risk
contribution theory.55
"Uniformity of risk" posed the greatest definitional problem for the
Thomas court. Because the defective product created a risk of harm,
this definition of fungibility is the one absolutely crucial for use of risk
contribution or market share theory.56 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
found that "uniformity of risk" depended on the "unit" of the good
considered. 7 For example, although each milligram of DES created the
49. 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
50. Id. at 180, 342 N.W.2d at 44.
51. Id. at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
52. See 2005 WI 129, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 701 N.W.2d 523.
53. Id. [ 142, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 142, 701 N.W.2d 523, 142.
54. Id. 91 143, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 143, 701 N.W.2d 523, 1 143.
55. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, T 143, 701 N.W.2d 523, 1 143.
56. See Rostron, supra note 15, at 168.
57. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, $1 144, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 144, 701 N.W.2d 523, 9 144; Rostron,
supra note 15, at 166.
2006]
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same "amount" of risk, each DES pill did not because of the different
pill dosages. 8 The court concluded that "strict chemical uniformity"
does not make a substance fungible;59 therefore, uniformity of risk
remains broader, including a similar, underlying risk rather than
identical "amounts" of risk in the product.6°
The Thomas court articulated a definition of fungibility first found in
Collins that incorporated the traditional view of fungibility found in the
UCC with the idea of uniformity of risk, which was so vital to the DES
cases. These three definitions become elements of a larger definition of
fungibility necessary for use of risk contribution theory. Prior to
Thomas, the Wisconsin courts had considered the definition of
fungibility with goods. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals described
gravel as fungible because of the similarities and indistinct nature of the
rock fragments. 6 This use of "fungible" seems to be attuned to the
definition of "physically indistinguishable" because of the extreme
similarity between the goods. In considering component parts of a
potentially defective ladder, the Wisconsin Supreme Court used the
word "fungible" in the context of "generic."62 This use is closer to the
"functional interchangeability" definition because each part is a
substitute for another part.
Though the court implicitly defined fungibility by its use in those
cases, the situations did not warrant the use of risk contribution theory
because the tortfeasor was known. Moreover, while rocks and ladders
may be physically indistinguishable and functionally interchangeable,
they do not create a uniformity of risk. It was not until the first DES
case, Collins, that the court had the opportunity to craft risk
contribution theory for a defective product made by an unknown
tortfeasor that created a special, uniform risk. 63 The court in Collins
recognized that DES created a uniform risk to the public because of its
underlying ingredient, and all producers of DES contributed to this
risk. 64
58. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 144, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 144, 701 N.W.2d 523, 144.
59. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 144, 701 N.W.2d 523, 144.
60. See id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 144, 701 N.W.2d 523, 144.
61. Konyn v. City of Marinette, No. 80-2220, 1981 WL 138676, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. July
7, 1981).
62. Strasser v. Transtech Mobile Fleet Serv., Inc., 2000 WI 87, 44, 236 Wis. 2d 435,
44, 613 N.W.2d 142, 1 44.
63. Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984).
64. Id. at 191 n.10, 342 N.W.2d at 49 n.10.
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III. APPORTIONMENT OF RISK BASED ON MARKET SHARE: A
CHAOTIC BACKDROP FOR THOMAS
In situations where the tortfeasor is unknown, the Wisconsin courts
will consider utilizing risk contribution theory in order to provide a
remedy to the injured plaintiff if the product is fungible. The Collins
court rejected other tests for apportioning liability with multiple
tortfeasors, such as concerted action and enterprise liability.65 Weighing
the interests of the "innocent plaintiff" against the manufacturers of
DES, the court found that it was better for the DES manufacturers to
bear the cost of the injury than the plaintiff. 66 The court found that
because the defendant provided a product that created the risk of injury
to the plaintiff, the defendant should bear the cost based on the risk it
put into the market.67 In considering comparative fault between the
multiple tortfeasors, the court considered certain factors which could
reduce or increase liability! 8 The court opened the possibility that risk
contribution theory could be used for other products that were
"factually similar" to DES; 69 yet, the Collins precedent left the lower
courts to interpret what products and situations were "factually similar"
to DES.
65. Id. at 182-87, 342 N.W.2d at 45-47. Concerted action is a theory of liability in which
multiple tortfeasors are acting in pursuit of a common plan. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 876 (1979). Enterprise liability is an industry-wide variant of concerted action in
which "each defendant that participates in perpetuating and using the inadequate standard
has contributed to and is liable for the plaintiff's injury." Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 186, 342
N.W.2d at 47.
66. Id. at 192, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
67. Id. at 191-92, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
68. Id. at 199-200, 342 N.W.2d at 53. The court considers these factors, that are
illustrative and not exclusive:
[(1)1 whether the drug company conducted tests on DES for safety and
efficacy in use for pregnancies; [(2)] to what degree the company took a
role in gaining FDA approval of DES for use in pregnancies; [(3)]
whether the company had a small or large market share in the relevant
area; [(4)] whether the company took the lead or merely followed the lead
of others in producing or marketing DES; [(5)] whether the company
issued warnings about the dangers of DES; [(6)] whether the company
produced or marketed DES after it knew or should have known of the
possible hazards DES presented to the public; and [(7)] whether the
company took any affirmative steps to reduce the risk of injury to the
public.
Id. at 200, 342 N.W.2d at 53.
69. Id. at 191, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
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A. Attempts to Extend Risk Contribution Theory after Collins
The court of appeals faced the possibility of extending the Collins
rationale and rejected risk contribution theory in Drezdzon v. AAA
Insurance Co.7" In Drezdzon, the plaintiff was injured when a metal box
slid off a forklift and struck his foot.71 Despite the fact the plaintiff
knew which particular tote box caused his injury at the time it struck
him,72 he somehow lost track of the box and, therefore, could not
remember the box or identify who manufactured the box; thus, he
named two potential manufacturers as defendants.73 The plaintiff asked
the trial court for a continuance of the hearing on defendants' motion
for summary judgment because he wished to develop a factual record to
show how his case was "factually similar" to DES in Collins.74 The trial
court denied plaintiff's request, and the court of appeals affirmed.75 The
court of appeals found the facts of this case were "materially different"
from Collins because (1) the injury occurred immediately; (2) the
plaintiff knew which particular metal box caused the injury at the time it
occurred; therefore, he had a "reasonable opportunity" to secure the
box and attempt to discover its manufacturer; (3) the plaintiff only had
two possible defendants rather than a large market; and (4) the product
was non-generic and could not be easily substituted. 76  The facts in
77Drezdzon simply did not rise to the level of those in the DES cases.
The court of appeals again faced this issue in Rogers v. AAA Wire
Products, Inc.78 In Rogers, the plaintiff was injured when a wire bread
cart collapsed as she was pulling it at the store in which she worked.79
Because the cart was not retained, the plaintiff was unsure which bread
cart injured her.' As a result, she named two defendants in a strict
liability and negligence action."' Both defendants had manufactured
bread carts provided to the store.' Once again, the court of appeals
70. No. 84-273, 1984 WL 180237 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1984).
71. Id. at *1.
72. Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *1.
74. Id.
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id. at *3.
77. Id.
78. 182 Wis. 2d 263, 513 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App. 1994).
79. Id. at 266, 513 N.W.2d at 644.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 267-68, 513 N.W.2d at 644.
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declined to extend Collins because the facts of Rogers were too factually
dissimilar.8 ' The court distinguished Collins by finding that just because
the plaintiff in Rogers could not identify the source of the bread cart,
this did not involve the important public policy issues that Collins
raised.' The court seemed clear that the Collins analysis was meant for
unique situations and that the plaintiff in Rogers did not have an
"insurmountable obstacle" in identifying the source of the bread cart.85
In both Drezdzon and Rogers, the court of appeals faced situations
in which there was an arguably unknown defendant tortfeasor and,
therefore, faced the possibility of using risk contribution theory to
fashion a remedy for the injured plaintiff. The question remained
whether these goods and situations were "factually similar" enough to
warrant the use of the Collins analysis. The court of appeals rightly
refused to extend the Collins analysis in these two situations. In both
Drezdzon and Rogers, the plaintiff did not know who manufactured the
product that caused the plaintiff's injuries. Yet, neither alternative
liability nor liability based on market share is appropriate for either the
metal tote box or the bread cart. The plaintiffs in both cases attempted
to use the Collins theory based simply on their inability to identify the
negligent defendant. For risk contribution theory to work, there must
be the possibility that each defendant is potentially liable. 6 In the case
of the metal tote box, there was no indication that the product itself was
defective in any way. The product merely slid off a forklift and struck
the plaintiff in the foot.87 Because the plaintiff could not secure the tote
box that struck him, the manufacturer could not be identified. 88 Beyond
the uncertainty of which tote box struck him, the plaintiff could not
point to a defect in the tote box manufactured by the defendant, which
would make this situation similar to DES. Rather, the defendant hoped
to use risk contribution theory to excuse himself from further discovery
and attempts to secure the tote box that struck him. It is evident that
83. Id. at 272, 513 N.W.2d at 646.
84. Id. at 272-73, 513 N.W.2d at 646.
85. Id. at 272, 513 N.W.2d at 646.
86. This is also true of alternative liability. Consider Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal.
1948). In Summers, the plaintiff sustained injuries to his eye and face when he was shot while
hunting. 199 P.2d at 2. He sued two different defendants, as each shot in the plaintiff's
direction and the plaintiff was unsure which defendant's ammunition struck him. Id.
Although the plaintiff was only shot by one defendant, each defendant was arguably negligent
for aiming towards the plaintiff and putting him in danger. Id.





one box struck him and the other did not; therefore, one manufacturer,
but not both, is potentially liable for his injuries. The court could not
extend the Collins analysis in this case because there was no possibility
both manufacturers contributed to his injury. Also, in the case of a
product such as the metal tote box, it is more likely that a distinguishing
feature could be found as manufacturers tend to mark their products for
recognition, if not for their own protection.
A similar situation was present in Rogers. The plaintiff could not
even identify which bread cart injured her, much less the manufacturer
of the bread cart, because the store in which she worked used several
different bread carts, and the bread cart that caused the injury was not
retained. 9 If her injuries were caused by a defect in the bread cart, it is
far from certain that each potential manufacturer who supplied bread
carts to the store in which the plaintiff worked supplied defective carts.
Once again, the court appropriately refused to extend Collins because
each potential defendant did not necessarily create a risk.
Through Drezdzon and Rogers, the court of appeals created a
marginally clearer picture of what a "factually similar" situation could
be. The factual situation would be one with more than two potential
defendants,'9 and there must be substantial difficulty in finding who
manufactured the product that caused the injury.9 Also, the court
considered whether the issue had enough public policy importance to
fashion a response] 2 It also seems a "factually similar" situation would
be one involving a product capable of mass exposure to the public. The
DES cases involved serious and permanent injuries to a large number of
plaintiffs; conversely, the plaintiffs in Drezdzon and Rogers represent
89. Rogers, 182 Wis. 2d at 266, 513 N.W.2d at 644.
90. See Drezdzon, 1984 WL 180237, at *3 ("Unlike the situation in Collins involving
hundreds of manufacturers, the undisputed facts in this case indicate that [plaintiff's]
employer purchased tote boxes from only Powell and Republic, thus vastly reducing the
number of defendants as to whom evidence had to be obtained."). Yet this analysis is not
completely accurate. The issue is not the number of potential defendants, but the fact that
each potential defendant created a risk. If only two potential manufacturers created a risk,
then, like the two defendants in Summers, each should be liable for the plaintiff's injury. It is
incorrect for the court to argue the number of defendants makes it easier to ascertain who
created the risk. If each defendant did create a risk, then having less defendants simply
reduces the risk of making a mistake concerning who caused the injury; it makes it no easier
to determine who actually caused the injury. Therefore, the actual number of defendants
should not factor into whether risk contribution can be used for a certain product; rather one
should consider whether each defendant actually created a risk.
91. Rogers, 182 Wis. 2d at 272, 513 N.W.2d at 646.
92. Id. at 272-73, 513 N.W.2d at 646.
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isolated instances that risk contribution theory was not meant to
address.
Yet distinguishing Drezdzon and Rogers from Collins really rests on
the lack of fungibility in the products. 93 In Drezdzon, the court found
that the metal box was not fungible using the definitions of physical
indistinguishability and functional interchangeability. 4 The boxes were
not physically indistinguishable because, although they were "very
similar," they were not "generic" like DES.95 Also, the boxes were not
functionally interchangeable because "companies filling orders for their
products cannot freely substitute the products of other companies."
96
The Rogers court, rather than defining or considering fungibility, stated
that risk contribution theory was probably not appropriate to decide the
issue because the plaintiff could fairly easily identify the source of the
cart that injured her.97 Even so, it is unlikely the bread cart would be
fungible because it is likely not physically indistinguishable (as most
companies put some distinguishing mark on their products) or
functionally interchangeable, nor does it create a uniformity of risk.
These situations, presented to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in
Drezdzon and Rogers, did not provide the court with a product in which
it might have extended the Collins analysis beyond DES. In both cases,
the plaintiffs could not distinguish who manufactured the injury-causing
product, but the lack of fungibility in these products created a situation
in which the potential defendants may not have even created a risk to
the plaintiff. Without the fungibility of the products, the court could not
extend risk contribution theory.
Therefore, attempts to extend risk contribution theory after Collins
failed because each product presented did not reach the three-element
standard of fungibility the court began to articulate in Collins and later
clarified in Thomas.
B. The Backdrop for Thomas: Conflicting Authority
Before the Wisconsin Supreme Court even considered Steven
Thomas' situation, jurisdictions across the United States had faced the
problem of what to do with the theory of apportioning liability based on
93. See Drezdzon, 1984 WL 180237, at *3 (finding the metal tote boxes are similar but




97. Rogers, 182 Wis. 2d at 272, 513 N.W.2d at 646.
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market share. The theory first gained prominence in the California
DES case, Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.98  After Sindell, many
jurisdictions considered market share liability theories for a variety of
products, though the majority of courts accepting the theory did so only
for cases of injury due to DES.' Most courts either rejected the theory
completely or rejected the theory for any product besides DES.'00
Because of the wide spread problems caused by lead paint poisoning,"'
lead paint seemed like a natural product for which to extend the theory
of market share liability. Although several attempts were made in
several different jurisdictions to extend market share liability to lead
paint poisoning cases, each attempt failed.102
98. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
99. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186, 190 & n.6 (D. Mass. 1992);
CETRULO, supra note 23. Other jurisdictions have allowed for the possibility of market share
liability for products other than DES, but these jurisdictions are in the minority and only have
allowed market share liability in very specific, isolated situations. See, e.g., Ray v. Cutter
Labs., 754 F. Supp. 193, 196 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (allowing market share liability for products
contaminated with HIV); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(allowing market share liability for DPT vaccines).
100. See, e.g., Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 70-71 (Tex. 1989) (rejecting
market share liability for asbestos cases); Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d
963, 972 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (rejecting market share liability for defective tire rim assembly);
Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (rejecting market share liability for
DES).
101. See generally National Safety Council - Lead Poisoning, supra note 12.
102. For example, in Skipworth v. Lead Industries Ass'n, 665 A.2d 1288, 1291-92 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1995), the plaintiff sued five former manufacturers of lead pigment, alleging she
was injured from ingesting lead pigment but could not identify the manufacturer of the
pigment she ingested. The court concluded that Pennsylvania has not adopted market share
liability as a theory of recovery and use of the theory would be a "significant departure from
the requirement that a plaintiff prove proximate cause." Id. Because the plaintiff could not
identify the manufacturer of any of the lead pigment she ingested, she was unable to carry her
burden of proof with respect to causation, and summary judgment was properly granted for
the defendants. Id. Unlike Skipworth, the court in Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.,
accepted the general theory of market share liability but rejected the theory in cases involving
lead-based paint. 782 F. Supp. at 192-93; see also Chicago v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 823 N.E.2d
126, 134 (I11. App. Ct. 2005) (expressly rejecting market share liability); Brenner v. Am.
Cyanamid Co., 732 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Div. 2001) (finding against the plaintiffs in their lead
poisoning action because they could not identify the manufacturer).
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IV. RISK CONTRIBUTION THEORY AFTER THOMAS: A USEABLE
STANDARD OF FUNGIBILITY
A. The Substantially Similar Situation
The wealth of case law dealing with market share liability and when
it should be applied created a muddled backdrop for the Wisconsin
courts in deciding what products (if any) to which the Collins theory
could be extended. 3 Subsequent to Collins, the Wisconsin courts
explored two situations where plaintiffs argued a product was "factually
similar" to DES."° The metal tote box and bread cart failed for several
reasons, but fungibility remained a deciding factor. In both cases, the
product in question did not meet the elements that DES fulfilled-the
metal boxes were not functionally interchangeable or physically
indistinguishable, 5 and the bread cart did not even rise to the level of
unknown tortfeasor to warrant application of risk contribution theory."°
Most importantly, neither the metal box nor the bread cart created a
uniformity of risk, the most vital element for fungibility as applied to
tort law. It was not until the court heard Thomas that it faced a
situation it found "factually similar" to DES in Collins."n
Through the Thomas decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
implicitly defined the crucial criteria for a product to be considered
"factually similar" to DES in Collins and, therefore, warrant the use of
risk contribution theory. The criteria hinges on fungibility. Lead
carbonate, like DES, meets a definition of fungibility that combines all
three necessary elements, including uniformity of risk (the most
important element). The court found that lead carbonate was
functionally interchangeable because all forms of the carbonate were
lead pigments and the pigments had the same function-providing the
"hiding power" of the paint.' The lead carbonates are also physically
indistinguishable because they are virtually identical to the consumer
when used in paint. °  The court acknowledged that the analysis of
"physical indistinguishability" is different with lead carbonate than with
103. See generally infra Part IV.B.
104. See Rogers v. AAA Wire Prods., Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 263, 513 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App.
1994); Drezdzon v. AAA Ins. Co., No. 84-273, 1984 WL 180237 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1984).
105. See Drezdzon, 1984 WL 180237, at *3.
106. See Rogers, 182 Wis. 2d at 272-73,513 N.W.2d at 646.
107. Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 149, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 149, 701 N.W.2d 523,
149.
108. Id. 146, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 146,701 N.W.2d 523, 1 146.
109. Id. 147, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 147, 701 N.W.2d 523, 147.
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DES but broadened the analysis to depend on the context in which the
product was being used and on who was using it."0 Finally, the court
found that lead carbonate met the definition of fungibility because there
was a uniformity of risk.'11 This uniformity depended on the "common
denominator" of lead-the underlying defective component112
With the articulation of these three elements, the court created a
more precise, usable definition of fungibility. Yet, of the three
elements, the uniformity of risk remains the most broad, thus potentially
allowing more goods to fall under its scope." 3
B. The Expansiveness of Uniformity of Risk
In his dissent in Thomas v. Mallett, Justice Wilcox accused the
majority of "drastically expand[ing] the ... parameters of Collins" and
"virtually eliminat[ing] the fungibility requirement." 114 He argued the
incongruous conclusion that under the majority's rationale, any form of
lead pigment is fungible with lead carbonate; therefore, the plaintiff in
Thomas could sue manufacturers of lead pencils"5 or lead pipes because
they all contain lead."6 Justice Wilcox misunderstood and misstated the
majority's argument. First, he misstated how the majority interpreted a
"factually similar" situation to Collins. Even if lead pencils and lead
pipes would pose a risk uniform to lead carbonate because of the
underlying ingredient of lead, the Thomas plaintiff could not sue the
manufacturers of lead pencils and lead pipes because they do not meet
110. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 147,701 N.W.2d 523, 1 147.
111. Id. 'I 148, 285 Wis. 2d 236, $ 148, 701 N.W.2d 523, 148.
112. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 148, 701 N.W.2d 523, 148.
113. Others argue the expansion of Collins is an isolated response to the problem of
poisoning by lead paint and should not be expanded beyond the facts of Thomas. See Diane
S. Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 723, 731 (2006).
Judge Sykes acknowledges that the Wisconsin Supreme Court's action in expanding Collins
could be extended to other products and industries, and she fears the consequences if the
liability system is not expanded incrementally. Id. She fears rapid expansion or sweeping
changes to causation requirements in other contexts could negatively affect the stability and
predictability of Wisconsin's liability system and economy. Id. Judge Sykes argues such a
sweeping change to the state's liability system should be addressed by the legislature as the
court is limited by the facts and circumstances of the specific situation before it. Id.
114. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 247, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 247, 701 N.W.2d 523, 247
(Wilcox, J., dissenting).
115. For the sake of argument, I am assuming "lead pencils" actually contain lead.
Although the earliest "lead pencils" were thought to contain lead, it was later discovered that
the pencils actually contained graphite. 9 THE NEW ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 254 (15th
ed. 1998).
116. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 248, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 248, 701 N.W.2d 523, 1 248
(Wilcox, J., dissenting).
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the other two requirements of fungibility-the products are not
functionally interchangeable and physically indistinguishable. The
majority found that these two factors are highly contextual, meaning
that they are dependent on the situation in which the product is used.17
The lead in lead pencils and lead pipes has a different function than the
lead in the lead carbonate, and the degree of similarity in the products
depends not just on the underlying ingredient, but also on the context in
which it is used."8 Any other interpretation would create an absurd
result.
Second, the issue is not whether there is a "common denominator"
with the good, but whether the "common denominator" creates a
common risk. The majority admitted that fungibility as a term cannot
be defined with "categorical precision."" 9 Rather, how it is defined
must depend on "the context of the injury, its cause, and the particular
obstacles encountered in linking the causation to the possibly negligent
defendants.""'2 Therefore, "uniformity of risk" remains more expansive,
depending on the circumstances. A good may still be fungible even if
there are different amounts of the underlying defective component, as
the fungibility stems from the risk of harm created by the underlying
defective component. The Collins court focused on the fact that each
DES manufacturer contributed to the creation of the risk of harm to
those injured plaintiffs.' 2 ' This did not relieve the plaintiffs of their
burden to prove causation, but it acknowledged the importance of the
underlying risk. 122
Therefore, the Thomas majority did not eliminate the requirement
of fungibility but refined it with a broader definition of uniformity of
risk.
C. Expanding Risk Contribution Theory Beyond DES
Because the court effectively defined the "factually similar" situation
by clarifying and expanding the definition of fungibility, it has allowed
the risk contribution theory to grow beyond the original use in DES
cases. In considering the expansion of risk contribution theory, the
117. See id. 145,285 Wis. 2d 236, 145,701 N.W.2d 523, 145 (majority opinion).
118. See id. 147, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 147, 701 N.W.2d 523, $ 147. Thus, the majority
relies on a definition of fungibility in which all three elements must be met.
119. Id. 145,285 Wis. 2d 236, 145, 701 N.W.2d 523, 145.
120. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 145, 701 N.W.2d 523, 145.




Wisconsin Supreme Court noted the potential definitions of fungibility
proposed by University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law
Professor Allan Rostron. 12 3 Professor Rostron argued for the expansion
of market share liability beyond the DES cases; however, he also argued
fungibility was unnecessary in market share liability theory and
hindered its expansion to other products.l 4 Though Rostron correctly
argued for the expansion of apportionment of liability based on market
share, he mistakenly assessed the role of fungibility in the analysis.
Rather than following Rostron's argument, the court used his
exploration of differing definitions of fungibility and articulated a rule
for risk contribution theory where fungibility is the cornerstone of the
theory. Rostron argued that because courts could not get past the
requirement of fungibility, proportional share liability would not expand
beyond DES."5  Rostron's argument was that fungibility was not
essential to the use of proportional share liability theories and that
liability could be allocated in other ways that take into account the
different defendants creating different levels of risk.
1 26
Yet, risk contribution theory can be expanded without discarding
fungibility as a requirement for use. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
shown that, within the definition of fungible, different levels of risk can
be taken into account. For deciding the initial prima facie showing that
a tortfeasor could be a potential defendant, the uniformity of risk
requires a showing of the "common denominator" of the risk-causing
element. After the plaintiff makes this initial showing, the defendants
still have the opportunity to exculpate themselves by showing that they
could not have caused the injury. '27 The defendants who cannot
exculpate themselves will then have negligence assigned based on
Wisconsin's comparative negligence statute, which can take into account
123. Professor Rostron is a professor of law in the areas of tort law, products liability,
constitutional law, and conflicts of law. Professor Rostron also served as Senior Staff
Attorney at the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence and has assisted in leading litigation
efforts against the gun industry. Allan Rostron - Biography, Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City
School of Law, http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/rostron.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2006).
Professor Rostron's work on market share liability was recently cited by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in its Thomas decision. See Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 141, 285 Wis. 2d 236,
141, 701 N.W.2d 523, 141.
124. See Rostron, supra note 15, at 155-56.
125. See id. at 215.
126. Id.
127. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 197-98, 342 N.W.2d at 52.
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different levels of risk created by different amounts of the harm-causing
ingredient. 128
In situations where the tortfeasors are unknown, allowing the
plaintiff to establish the fungibility requirement of the plaintiff's prima
facie case by showing the product is "factually similar" to Collins will
expand the usefulness of a theory that, until Thomas, only effectively
applied to DES cases. The plaintiff will still need to prove the elements
of strict liability or negligence, 29 depending on what the plaintiff is
alleging, but the plaintiff will be able to go forward with the case and
have the opportunity to seek a remedy. 3° In other words, the use of risk
contribution theory does not absolve the plaintiff from proving
causation.
A common criticism of using risk contribution theory for lead paint
cases is that the injury caused by lead is not a unique injury and could
occur from many different sources, such as social or environmental
sources, lead in other products, or heredity. 3' The Thomas court
acknowledges this possibility by stating that the plaintiff must still prove
the white lead carbonate actually caused the injuries. 3 2 A recent article
by Professor Donald G. Gifford stated, "Thomas v. Mallett could turn
out to be the most direct and important challenge to the individual
causation requirement yet."'33  Gifford and the Thomas dissent both
misinterpret the majority's expansion of risk contribution theory as an
eradication of the causation requirement. Their interpretation is simply
not true. In fact, the majority acknowledged that the defendant will
have "ample grounds to attack and eviscerate" the plaintiff's claims
128. See id. at 198-99, 342 N.W.2d at 52-53; WiS. STAT. § 895.045 (2003-2004).
129. See Thomas v. Mallet, 2005 WI 129, 1 161-62, 285 Wis. 2d 236, TT 161-62, 701
N.W.2d 523, 161-62.
130. See id. 161-63,285 Wis. 2d 236, J1 161-63,701 N.W.2d 523, $J 161-63.
131. Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 782 F. Supp. 186,192 (D. Mass. 1992).
132. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, 156,285 Wis. 2d 236, 156,701 N.W.2d 523, 156.
133. Donald G. Gifford, The Challenge to the Individual Causation Requirement in Mass
Products Torts, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 873, 905 (2005). He continues by quoting the
Thomas dissent:
The end result of the majority opinion is that the defendants, lead
pigment manufacturers, can be held liable for a product they may or may
not have produced, which may or may not have caused the plaintiff's
injuries, based on conduct that may have occurred over 100 years ago
when some of the defendants were not even part of the relevant
market .... [N]one of these facts seem to matter to the majority.




based on the plaintiff's need to prove causation.'m Also, the majority
accounted for the possibility that some manufacturers may not have
been a part of the market at the relevant time; therefore, the defendant
has the opportunity to exculpate itself if it was not part of the market at
the relevant time. 135
V. RISK CONTRIBUTION THEORY: A STATUTORY RESPONSE
In quick response to the Thomas decision, the Wisconsin legislature
enacted a statute relating to actions against manufacturers, distributors,
sellers, and promoters of products that would limit the scope of
Thomas.136 The statute was approved by the State Senate and State
Assembly in approximately four and five months, respectively, after the
decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court."' Wisconsin Governor Jim
Doyle has since vetoed the bill, but still faces a "showdown in the
Legislature."'' 8 The proposed statute required the claimant to prove the
manufacturer actually manufactured the specific product alleged to have
caused the harm; or, if the claimant could not prove this, the
manufacturer would be liable if the claimant could prove that (1) no
other legal process exists in which the claimant can seek redress for the
claimant's injury; (2) the claimant suffered an injury caused by a product
chemically identical to the specific product alleged to have caused the
claimant's injury; (3) the manufacturer manufactured the product that is
chemically identical to the specific product that caused the claimant's
harm; (4) the product was manufactured in the state during the time
period in which the product that caused the claimant's injury was
manufactured; and (5) the defendants named in the action collectively
manufactured at least eighty percent of all products sold in the state
chemically identical to the product that caused the harm during the
relevant time period.'39 This proposed statute also would have limited
the time period for liability; specifically, a manufacturer would not be
liable if more than twenty-five years have passed since it manufactured
its last "chemically identical" product."4
134. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, T 163, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 163, 701 N.W.2d 523, $ 163.
135. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 163, 701 N.W.2d 523, 163.
136. Wisconsin Jobs Preservation Act, S.B. 402, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2005).
137. Thorn Wilder, Toxic Substances: Veto Urged of Wisconsin Bill Giving Immunity to
Paint Companies in Lead-Poisoning Case, CHEM. REG. DAILY, Dec. 27, 2005.
138. Johnson, supra note 35.
139. Wis. S.B. 402.
140. Id.
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In the drafting records, Senior Legislative Attorney Robert P.
Nelson expressed confusion over the legislature's use of "chemical
identity," asking whether this terminology limited products based on
their chemical composition.' The response to Attorney Nelson's
question consisted of the statement that "chemically identical" was
"simply a definition of fungibility" which "reflects what the court did in
the Collins case."'42  If "chemical identity" was based on chemical
composition only, for products such as lead carbonate that are not
chemically identical as a whole but contain an identical harm-causing
element (and otherwise meet the Thomas court's standards of
fungibility), this requirement would effectively disallow the use of risk
contribution theory for this product. Collins was more concerned about
the risk that DES created rather than the fact that DES was chemically
identical.
The statute also alters how liability is apportioned after the
defendants are initially found. For multiple tortfeasors found negligent,
they would only be severally liable, not jointly liable. "3 This change
would mean that each tortfeasor is only liable for his or her
proportionate share. This would change how fault was originally
apportioned based on the comparative negligence statute, which states
that if a defendant is less than fifty-one percent negligent, then the
defendant is only liable for the defendant's portion of fault; yet, if a
tortfeasor is more than fifty-one percent negligent, the tortfeasor will be
jointly and severally liable with other tortfeasors.M
Some opponents feared the statute because of the time limits it
would set on the tortfeasors, which could bar a plaintiff from naming
certain defendants. 14 Also, in addition to the time limit barring certain
defendants, requiring the named defendants to have collectively
manufactured at least eighty percent of all products sold in the state
chemically identical to the product that caused the harm during the
relevant time period creates a very high standard that could effectively
render risk contribution theory unworkable, especially if certain
defendants needed to make up the eighty percent are barred due to time
limitations or have gone out of business. In vetoing the proposed
141. Robert P. Nelson, Drafter's Note from the Legislative Reference Bureau, No.
LRB-3756 (Oct. 6, 2005) (on file with author).
142. Response to Drafter's Note LRB-3756 to Robert P. Nelson (Oct. 11, 2005) (on file
with author).
143. Wis. S.B. 402, § 1(6).
144. WIS. STAT. § 895.045 (2003-2004).
145. See Wilder, supra note 137.
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legislation, Governor Doyle focused on public policy, stating "I cannot
sign a law that closes the doors of justice to children who have been
poisoned."'46 Supporters of the bill argued that the Thomas decision has
created a "guilty even if you're innocent" standard detrimental to
manufacturers. 
47
It is unclear how the changes proposed by this statute would limit
the scope of Thomas because the legislature apparently defined
fungibility based on Collins, which was the root of the definition of
fungibility in Thomas. Utilizing the same definition articulated in
Thomas, this statute would only limit the scope of Thomas in the
restrictions on the time period in which a manufacturer can be held
liable, the need to name enough defendants to cover eighty percent of
the market, and on how final fault is apportioned between the negligent
tortfeasors. Even with the Thomas definition of fungibility intact, these
changes would undoubtedly limit many of the defendants that an injured
plaintiff could sue or bar the injured plaintiff from suing altogether, but
it would not altogether disallow risk contribution to expand to other
goods.
Therefore, concerning the definition of fungibility as an element of
the plaintiff's prima facie case, the legislature failed to change the
Wisconsin Supreme Court's definition in Thomas by using the term
"chemically identical" to define the product. Without changing the
meaning of fungibility, the legislature is faced with the court's argument
in Thomas-chemical identity does not determine fungibility.
148
Therefore, even if this bill, or a similar bill, eventually becomes law, risk
contribution theory could still be available for products beyond DES.
VI. CONCLUSION
Theories of liability based on apportionment by market share began
with the DES cases, where plaintiffs were remediless because of an
"invisible" defendant. In Wisconsin, this theory was first articulated and
utilized in Collins. It took twenty-one years for the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to revisit risk contribution theory after two unsuccessful attempts
at the court of appeals by plaintiffs who tried to extend the theory to
146. Johnson, supra note 35.
147. See Memorandum from Wis. Mfrs. & Commerce, supra note 35.
148. See Thomas v. Mallett, 2005 WI 129, 140, 285 Wis. 2d 236, 140, 701 N.W.2d 523,
T 140.
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products beyond DES. 149 With Thomas, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
refined the test for fungibility first articulated in Collins and showed that
to be "factually similar," a product must be a fungible good.5 ° To be
fungible, the product must be functionally interchangeable and
physically indistinguishable, and there must be a uniformity of risk.'
The Wisconsin Supreme Court restated the Collins test in a more
useable form that will allow the theory to expand to more products
beyond DES and lead carbonate. Because of the element of uniformity
of risk and its potentially broad application, the idea of a fungible good
extends well beyond the definition articulated in the UCC and will have
expansive use in tort law. The Thomas decision was groundbreaking in
tort law and, through the clear and precise definition of fungibility
articulated by the Thomas court, risk contribution theory has the
opportunity to expand well beyond the scope of DES. The iceberg has
finally emerged.
LAURA L. WORLEY
149. See Rogers v. AAA Wire Prods., Inc., 182 Wis. 2d 263, 513 N.W.2d 643 (Ct. App.
1994); Drezdzon v. AAA Ins. Co., No. 84-273, 1984 WL 180237 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 12,1984).
150. Thomas, 2005 WI 129, [ 145-49, 285 Wis. 2d 236, $ 145-49, 701 N.W.2d 523,
145-49.
151. Id., 285 Wis. 2d 236, 1 145-49, 701 N.W.2d 523, 145-49.
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